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SEXUALLY SPEAKING: “DON’T ASK, DON’T TELL” AND THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT AFTER LAWRENCE V. TEXAS 
SHANNON GILREATH* 
INTRODUCTION 
A couple of years ago, a good friend of mine, a man who is involved with a 
male enlisted member of the military, watched his partner leave for Iraq. 
Naturally, my friend and his partner are involved in a very discreet relationship 
because of the military’s ban on openly gay service members—the so-called 
“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy. My friend phoned me to express how painful 
their parting was. Interestingly, the most stinging part for my friend was his 
detachment from the heterocentric drama unfolding around him at the military 
base. Everywhere he looked, it seemed, opposite-sex couples embraced, and 
some wept openly and kissed. But as the transport carrying my friend’s partner 
of five years left Fort Bragg, North Carolina, he could only stare silently. My 
friend and his partner could not share one last embrace or one last goodbye kiss 
because of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.” Such public displays of same-sex affection 
trigger separation proceedings under current military regulations.1 
At that same time, across the country in Washington State, Major Margaret 
Witt was finding herself at the mercy of those same regulations.2 In 2004, the 
military began separation proceedings against Witt—a reservist and decorated 
nineteen-year veteran with the Air Force—when an anonymous tip revealed 
that she was in a long-term lesbian relationship. By all accounts, Witt was an 
exemplary service member. She was a stellar operating-room and flight nurse; 
President Bush awarded her the Air Medal for service in the Middle East and, 
later, the Air Force Commendation Medal. Even as the military scrambled to 
find qualified nurses to fill open positions, Witt was discharged. 
In 2006, a federal district judge dismissed the suit that Witt brought to get 
her job back. Witt argued that “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” was unconstitutional “as 
applied” to her, and that Lawrence v. Texas3 and United States v. Marcum4 
 
 * Professor Gilreath is Adjunct Professor of Law and Gender Studies at Wake Forest 
University. He is also assistant director for the School of Law’s International Graduate (LL.M.) 
Program. Thanks go to Professor Michael Kent Curtis for comments on a previous draft, to Ms. 
Rosemary Sigmon for her typing assistance, and to Duke University law student Ryan S. Higgins. 
 1. For similar stories, see Kathi Westcott & Rebecca Sawyer, Silent Sacrifices: The Impact of 
“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” on Lesbian and Gay Military Families, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 1123 (2007). 
 2. See Tan Vinh, Lesbian Challenges Military Policy, SEATTLE TIMES, April 13, 2006, at B2, available 
at http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2002927616_lawsuit13m.html. 
 3. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 4. 60 M.J. 198 (C.A.A.F. 2004). 
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established a liberty interest in the off-base private conduct for which she was 
punished. The judge disagreed: 
The majority opinion in Lawrence did not change the framework within which 
[“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”] should be evaluated. Accordingly, prior case law 
approving [the policy] is not affected and [“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”] remains 
constitutional as a regulation on individual conduct. Moreover, plaintiff fails to 
demonstrate that her interest in liberty is affected by the government’s effort to 
separate her from military service.5 
The judge also tersely dismissed the notion that Witt’s separation implicated the 
First Amendment.6 
This article argues that the military’s ban on gays—currently embodied in 
the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy—is facially unconstitutional because it 
violates the First Amendment’s guarantees of free speech and expression.7 The 
argument that the military’s ban on gays, the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy, 
and the military’s underlying criminalization of sodomy are all unconstitutional 
under the First Amendment has been brilliantly examined before.8 Certainly, 
prior to Witt, the courts rejected the idea that First Amendment heightened 
scrutiny should apply to “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.”9 Traditionally, the government 
has argued that service members are not being punished for the statement, “I 
 
 5. Witt v. U.S. Dep’t of the Air Force, 444 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1148 (W.D. Wash. 2006) (alterations 
added). 
 6. Id. at 1146–47. 
 7. “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” codified at 10 U.S.C. § 654 (2000), is the result of a compromise 
between the Clinton administration and Congress. Clinton made campaign promises indicating that 
he would lift the ban, but the issue became a political lightning rod. For a discussion of the Clinton 
efforts and the ensuing backlash, see SHANNON GILREATH, SEXUAL POLITICS: THE GAY PERSON IN 
AMERICA TODAY 28 (2006) [hereinafter GILREATH, SEXUAL POLITICS]. 
The “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” compromise (officially, “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, Don’t Pursue, Don’t 
Harass”) maintains that merely having a homosexual orientation is not itself a bar to military 
service, but that engaging in, or possessing the propensity to engage in, homosexual conduct may 
be. See Dep’t of Defense Directive No. 1332.14, Enlisted Administrative Separations, at encl. 3 
¶ E3.A1.1.8.1.1 (1994) [hereinafter DoDD 1332.14], available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/ 
corres/pdf/133214p.pdf; cf. Dep’t of Defense Instr. 5505.8, Investigations of Sexual Misconduct by 
the Defense Criminal Investigative Organizations and Other DoD Law Enforcement Organizations, 
at §§ 4, 6, & encl. 2 (2005) [hereinafter DoDI 5505.8], available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/ 
directives/corres/pdf/i55058_012405/i55058p.pdf. 
 8. See, e.g., David Cole & William N. Eskridge, Jr., From Hand-Holding to Sodomy: First 
Amendment Protection of Homosexual (Expressive) Conduct, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 319 (1994). 
 9. See Pruitt v. Cheney, 963 F.2d 1160 (9th Cir. 1991); Schowengerdt v. United States, 944 F.2d 
483 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1514 (1992); Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068 (Fed. 
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1003 (1990); High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 
895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1990); Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 
1004 (1990). 
Under the old outright ban on gays, the military purported to focus on the “status” of being 
homosexual. That alone was justification for separation from the service. That position certainly had 
its constitutional problems, but courts were content to reject any First Amendment challenges 
precisely because it was “the identity that makes [service members] ineligible for military service, 
not the speaking of it aloud.” Marsh, 881 F.2d 454 at 462. 
The free-speech argument has also been rejected subsequent to Witt. See Cook v. Rumsfeld, 429 F. 
Supp. 2d 385 (2006), appeal argued sub nom Cook v. Gates, Nos. 06-2313, 06-2381 (1st Cir. Argued Mar. 
7, 2007). 
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am a homosexual.” Rather, the government argues that it merely uses this 
statement as an evidentiary admission that the speaker will engage in 
homosexual sex acts, which are illegal under the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice.10 But in this article, I argue that the Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence 
v. Texas11 makes “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” unconstitutional by significantly 
altering the reality in which “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” operated—formerly, a 
reality in which the Court held that no constitutional interest in privacy 
protected individuals from harassment by the law when they engaged in sex 
practices that the “moral” majority of their fellow citizens found “depraved” or 
“unnatural.”12 This was so even when the basis for that judgment was moral 
sentiment formed at a time when religious dissenters were burned at the stake 
and those daring to suggest that the earth revolved round the sun were likewise 
branded moral degenerates.13 Lawrence, when read with integrity, went a long 
way toward obliterating this ancien régime of moral enslavement.14 Certainly, 
Lawrence ruled that state laws that continued to criminally punish consenting 
adults engaging in “sodomy” in private were unconstitutional.15 
The continuation of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” which allegedly treats an 
admission of homosexual conduct (through expressive activity or verbal 
utterance) as an evidentiary indication that the speaker has the propensity to 
engage in a criminal act (“sodomy”), when the underlying act (“sodomy”) can 
 
 10. See 10 U.S.C. § 925 (2000) (codifying Uniform Code of Military Justice, Article 125); see also 
MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, at pt. IV, Art. 125, ¶ 51 (2005), available at 
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/law/mcm.pdf. 
 11. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 12. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558. 
 13. Of course, Church-sponsored homophobia is not a thing of the past, but the illusory logic on 
which it is based—that homosexuality is unnatural—certainly is. See, e.g., Dean H. Hamer et al., A 
Linage Between DNA Markers on the X Chromosome and Male Sexual Orientation, 261 SCI. 321 (1993); 
Simon LeVay, A Difference in Hypothalamic Structure Between Heterosexual and Homosexual Men, 253 
SCI. 1034 (1991); J. Michael Bailed & Richard C. Pillard, A Genetic Study of Male Sexual Orientation, 38 
ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1089 (1991); see generally TIMOTHY F. MURPHY, GAY SCIENCE (1997); 
Shannon Gilreath, Of Fruit Flies and Men: Rethinking Immutability in Equal Protection Analysis—With a 
View Toward a Constitutional Moral Imperative, 9 J. L. & SOC. CHANGE 1, 8–10 (2006); GILREATH, SEXUAL 
POLITICS, supra note 7, at 116–22 (2006). The Catholic Church finally got around to reversing the 
excommunication of Galileo in 1992 (a little more than 350 years after he faced the Inquisition) and, 
one assumes, the Church must feel a similar embarrassment over the thousands of “heretics” burned 
at the stake. Perhaps in another 350 years it will come to par on the gay question. 
 14. Some courts continue to take a crabbed view of Lawrence, reinvigorating anti-sodomy 
statutes by treating Lawrence as a sort of legal sieve—an opinion full of holes that allows states to 
criminalize sexual activity not falling strictly within the factual situation before the Lawrence Court. 
See, e.g., In re R.L.C., 635 S.E.2d 1, 3 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that prosecution for the “crime 
against nature” was constitutionally permissible for consensual oral sex between a male minor and 
his minor girlfriend, despite the fact that the state had a comprehensive statute excepting from 
criminal punishment sex acts between minors separated by less than three years in age). 
 15. 539 U.S. at 578. 
The State cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by making their private 
sexual conduct a crime. Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the 
full right to engage in their conduct without the intervention of the government. . . . The 
Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the 
personal and private life of the individual. 
Id. 
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no longer be constitutionally criminalized, shifts the focus of the policy. It now 
emphasizes that same-sex kissing, hand-holding, cuddling, etc. sends the 
message that “I am gay” and presumes an uncomfortable reception of that 
message by the majority of heterosexual soldiers. In other words, “Don’t Ask, 
Don’t Tell” is no longer afforded its convenient cover as a conduct-based 
regulation.16 “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” is exposed for what it is: a constitutionally-
impermissible effort to silence gays in the military. 
 
 16. In this essay, I contend that Lawrence has rendered homosexual sex acts protected even in 
the military setting. But in an amicus brief filed in the Cook litigation (and after I finished this essay), 
a group of First Amendment scholars argue that (assuming arguendo that homosexual sex can still be 
regulated in the military), “[w]hen government uses protected speech as the sole basis for shifting 
the burden to the speaker to prove that he has not violated a law or policy . . . that statutory 
presumption require[s] careful scrutiny under the First Amendment[.]” See Brief for Constitutional 
Law Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants at 13, Cook v. Gates, Nos. 06-2313, 06-2381 
(1st Cir. argued Mar. 7, 2007) [hereinafter First Amendment Brief] (emphasis in original, alterations 
added), available at http://www.sldn.org/binary-data/SLDN_ARTICLES/pdf_file/3309.pdf. 
For this premise, they cite the Supreme Court’s decision in Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958). 
Speiser involved a California law which provided a tax exemption to discharged veterans but 
withheld the benefit unless the potential recipient signed an oath disavowing that he had ever 
advocated for “the overthrow of the Government . . . by force or violence or . . . the support of a 
foreign government against the United States in event of hostilities.” Id. at 514–15. Anyone who 
refused to sign was presumed ineligible for the exemption. They could, however, attempt to rebut 
the presumption. Id. at 522–23. The Court invalidated the regulation, holding that it would 
“necessarily produce a result which the State could not command directly,” i.e., chilling speech and 
advocacy. Id. at 526, 528–29. 
The amici professors argue that “Speiser made it crystal clear that chilling protected speech through 
an evidentiary presumption offends the First Amendment, just as chilling speech through a direct 
regulation would. . . . For nearly fifty years, Speiser has confirmed what common sense dictates: “It is 
apparent that a constitutional prohibition cannot be transgressed indirectly by the creation of a 
statutory presumption any more than it can be violated by direct enactment.” First Amendment 
Brief, supra, at 15 (citing Speiser, 357 U.S. at 526). 
The amici distinguish the seemingly contradictory precedent of Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 
(1993), which held that the First Amendment “does not prohibit the evidentiary use of speech to 
establish the elements of a crime or to prove motive or intent.” Id. at 489. The amici argue that 
Mitchell is much narrower than many courts have believed, standing only for “the prosaic 
proposition that government may sometimes use a person’s speech as evidence in a criminal or 
disciplinary proceeding, provided that the method it employs does not chill protected expression.” 
First Amendment Brief, supra, at 16. 
The amici professors, I believe, make a very convincing point. The speech at issue in Mitchell was 
used only as evidence in the sentencing phase of Mitchell’s conviction, as evidence that Mitchell’s 
actions constituted a “hate crime.” Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 489. “The Court concluded that the particular 
evidentiary use to which speech was put under the provision did not chill protected speech. The 
Wisconsin law merely used the defendant’s contemporaneous statement that he was selecting his 
victim on the basis of race as evidence that his motive in that case was indeed racial.” First 
Amendment Brief, supra, at 17. 
The harm of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” is at once more apparent and more finely sinuous than that at 
issue in Mitchell. There is no need merely to “speculate” on the chilling effects of “Don’t Ask, Don’t 
Tell.” Cf. Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 488. The military has proven that the expression of a gay identity will 
be met with immediate discharge, unless the service member can perform the Herculean task of 
rebutting the presumption. At best, the military has a history of medicalizing homosexuality in war 
time, only to unceremoniously discharge the gay service member when he is no longer useful. See 
GILREATH, SEXUAL POLITICS, supra note 7, at 15. The attendant stifling of peaceful social debate with 
“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” makes it a far different scenario than the one at issue in Mitchell. 
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Part I of this article examines the First Amendment implications of “Don’t 
Ask, Don’t Tell” and points out an important but oft-overlooked fact: “Don’t 
Ask, Don’t Tell” purports to be focusing on conduct—not speech. I discuss the 
Lawrence decision’s effects on the military’s evidentiary defense for “Don’t Ask, 
Don’t Tell.” Part II explains why a traditional posture of deferring to military 
decision-making does not save “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.” Part III explains why 
“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” is appropriately evaluated under heightened First 
Amendment review. Part IV subjects the oft-cited defenses of “Don’t Ask, Don’t 
Tell” to First Amendment scrutiny and finds that, in addition to failing 
heightened scrutiny, the defenses also fail rational basis review. 
I. FIRST AMENDMENT VALUES AND “DON’T ASK, DON’T TELL”: 
WHAT’S DIFFERENT NOW? 
The framers of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” carefully tried to avoid First 
Amendment problems by excluding expressive activities such as participating in 
a gay rally in civilian attire, associating with known homosexuals, possessing or 
reading homosexual publications, or being present at a gay bar, from the 
expressive activity that constitutes a basis for discharge.17 Of course, grounds for 
separation arise if, while at that gay bar, a member grasps the hand of someone 
of the same gender, or dances with someone of the same gender, or kisses 
someone of the same gender.18 As such, the Department of Defense maintains 
that “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” is focused only on conduct: “[S]exual orientation is 
considered a personal and private matter, and [a homosexual orientation] is not 
a bar to continued service . . . unless manifested by homosexual conduct . . . .”19 
So, says the military, expressive conduct is used as a sort of evidentiary 
apparatus to measure an individual’s likelihood of engaging in homosexual sex 
acts, which, at the time “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” was promulgated, were criminal 
in the military setting (and in some parts of civilian society). This evidentiary 
expression includes even pure speech such as “I am gay,” because the military 
defines “homosexual conduct” to include “a statement by the Service member 
that demonstrates a propensity or intent to engage in homosexual acts. . . .”20 
The military brass believes that “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” does not implicate 
First Amendment values because, in its view, “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” targets the 
underlying criminal conduct. At a Congressional hearing on the implementation 
of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” law professor Cass Sunstein told the Subcommittee, 
“I think one ought not to worry about judicial challenges. . . . There is no 
impermissible content discrimination when the government uses words as 
evidence of regulable behavior or status.”21 Sunstein indicated that the “question 
 
 17. See DoDD 1332.14, supra note 7, at encl. 3 ¶ E3.A4.3.3.4. These examples are taken from the 
Guidelines for Fact-Finding Inquiries into Homosexual Conduct, which constitute Attachment 4 of 
Enclosure 3 of DoDD 1332.14. 
 18. See id. at encl. 3 ¶¶ E3.A4.2.4.1, E3.A4.3.4.3. 
 19. Id. at encl. 3 ¶ E3.A1.1.8.1.1 (alteration added). 
 20. Id. at encl. 3 ¶¶ E3.A4.2.4.1–2. 
 21. Assessment of the Plan to Lift the Ban on Homosexuals in the Military: Hearing Before the 
Subcommitttee on Military Forces and Personnel of the House Committee on Armed Services, 103d Cong. 
322 (1993) (statement of Prof. Cass R. Sunstein). 
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is whether homosexual conduct, as defined, is regulable behavior or status.”22 
He opined that because the government could permissibly criminalize 
homosexual sex acts, it could use expressive conduct and statements as evidence 
of that underlying criminal activity. I think Sunstein was wrong, constitutionally 
speaking, even in 1993, but he told members of Congress exactly what they 
hoped to hear. He agreed that “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” was a mechanism for 
excluding from armed service those who would engage in criminal activity, i.e., 
sodomy. With that as its purported aim, “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” was cast as 
concerning criminal conduct—not expression qua expression. 
But this clever ruse was deflated by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Armed Forces in United States v. Marcum.23 In Marcum, an Air Force officer was 
convicted of violating Article 125 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (the 
provision prohibiting sodomy) by engaging in sodomy with a military 
subordinate.24 The highest military court held that the privacy interest explicated 
in Lawrence v. Texas extended to military personnel when the sex takes place 
between consenting adults and when no coercion is involved.25 As discussed 
above, the landmark Lawrence decision was a watershed for gay rights, holding 
that criminalizing sodomy that occurs between consenting adults in private is 
unconstitutionally inconsistent with the liberty protected by the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.26 The Lawrence and Marcum decisions 
leave “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” in a strange place: The policy currently operates as 
an evidentiary mechanism for the military to target conduct that, according to 
the military’s own courts, can no longer be criminalized. Despite this curious 
position, “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” continues. 
Now that there is no underlying criminal conduct, it is unclear what reason 
the military could have for its continuation of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” except 
that expressions of homosexuality are banned because of the unpopular 
message they send to other service members. The statement “I am gay” (and the 
challenge to heteronormativity inherent in “coming out”) is a particular 
viewpoint that the military leadership believes its rank and file could not 
stomach. Lawrence and Marcum have drawn back the curtain on this real 
objective and exposed it as the most egregious First Amendment error the 
government can commit: “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” is viewpoint discrimination. 
The government regulates homosexual expressive conduct purely for its 
communicative content—targeting homosexual expression qua expression, while 
parallel expression by heterosexuals, i.e., “I am straight,” goes unrestrained. The 
fact that the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy’s definition of “conduct” includes a 
verbal statement of sexual identity exposes its aim to regulate pure speech. This 
type of speech restriction strikes at the First Amendment’s very core. 
The liberty to engage in consensual sex acts—protected under Lawrence—
and the right to express one’s proclivity to engage in such constitutionally-
 
 22. Id. 
 23. 60 M.J. 198 (C.A.A.F. 2004). 
 24. Id. at 199. 
 25. Id. at 205–06. The court declined to strike Marcum’s conviction, however, because it viewed 
the officer/subordinate relationship as inherently coercive. 
 26. 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 
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protected acts—implicated in traditional First Amendment analysis—are linked 
in important ways. Each explication of liberty is concerned with more than just 
the ability to “be.” The liberty interests in question also involve the ability to 
have that state of being recognized and respected by majoritarian society—even 
one that may be hostile to it. To that end, the First Amendment’s guarantee of 
free expression serves two primary and related purposes. One purpose is the 
basic communicative interest—the essential right to speak one’s mind—that we 
most often think of when thinking of the First Amendment. 
The other purpose is developmental.27 Expression is a prized component of 
liberty because it allows us to define ourselves on our own terms; it allows us to 
make the statement—to foes and detractors, loves and beloveds: “This I am; and 
here I make my stand.” Moreover, the act of publicly affirming or rejecting any 
given identity is developmental in the strictest sense. It is part of the great 
human effort to chart one’s own destiny; the Supreme Court itself recognized 
this in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston.28 Hurley 
involved a gay group wishing to march, as a group under their own identifying 
banner, in a concededly private parade and against the parade organizer’s 
wishes. The Court held that the forced inclusion of the gay group would violate 
the speech rights of the parade organizers by forcing the organizers to implicitly 
convey a message that they did not wish to send. Particularly, the Court held 
that the inclusion of the group, whose message was essentially, “We are gay,” 
“suggest[s] the view that [gay] people . . . have as much claim to unqualified 
social acceptance as heterosexuals . . . .”29 
In much the same way, requiring a gay member of the armed services to 
feign a heterosexual identity is compelled speech. In Hurley, gays had many 
other avenues for their expression. In the military they do not. As Hurley 
recognizes, the denial of the right to affirm one’s sexual identity denies gays the 
right to express their claim for social acceptance—a claim others have a right to 
reject but not to suppress. For more than sixty years, it has been bedrock First 
Amendment jurisprudence that forcing an individual to avow a creed to which 
he does not subscribe is as injurious to liberty as prohibiting him from speaking 
altogether.30 “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” prohibits the gay service member from 
living an authentic existence and requires him, by the implicit approbation of his 
silence, to espouse the message that only heterosexuals are fit to serve in the 
armed defense of the nation. Even in the face of direct questioning about her 
own sexual identity, the service member may at best respond with “no 
 
 27. See Cole & Eskridge, supra note 8, at 326. 
Sexual conduct is also important to the developmental feature of the liberty values. The 
First Amendment protects the individual’s freedom to explore, develop, and expand upon 
her identity. It assures that the state may not seek to control a person’s thoughts or beliefs, 
those intellectual characteristics that are central to our identities. 
Id. 
 28. 515 U.S. 557 (1995). 
 29. Id. at 574–75 (alterations added). The Court’s unanimous opinion suggests that the 
statement “I am gay” is inextricably linked with the greater moral debate about the place of the gay 
person in American society. 
 30. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (holding that compulsory 
recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance violates the First Amendment). 
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comment.”31 Forcing gay and lesbian service members to remain silent in the 
face of heterosexist assertions of superiority violates their First Amendment 
rights.32 
Hurley also suggests that, as much as the expression of a homosexual 
identity is developmental in the individual sense, it is developmental in the 
societal sense as well. Freedom of speech ensures that interpersonal 
understanding grows as individuals are confronted by the truth as other people 
see it.33 It provides, for most of us who contemplate only our own way of being, 
a glimpse of the other—a glimpse of the life behind the words. Alice Walker, the 
African-American activist and feminist, might call it “learning to sit with one 
another’s truths.”34 
Professor Tobias Wolff explored a related point in his assessment of the 
scope of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” which he concluded reached far beyond the 
 
 31. See Able v. United States, 968 F. Supp. 850, 859 (E.D.N.Y. 1997), rev’d on other grounds, 155 
F.3d 628 (2d Cir. 1998); see also First Amendment Brief, supra note 16, at 9–12 (elaborating a similar 
argument). 
 32. The Supreme Court has ruled that this sort of compulsory, silent compliance violates the 
First Amendment’s Establishment Clause in school prayer cases, because “remaining silent can 
signify adherence to a view.” See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 593 (1992). 
 33. As illustrative of this point, consider this description of the results of the racial integration of 
the military in the 1940s: 
A mere three years after President Truman’s 1948 order, the proportion of white soldiers 
opposing racial integration had dropped from 80 percent to 44 percent. The military’s 
model for sensitivity training on racial and other diversity issues has been lauded and 
unabashedly copied in the civilian world. Moreover, there are striking similarities between 
the obstacles faced by the military in enforcing President Truman’s directive and that 
which will be faced by the military should the Supreme Court find the current 
homosexual ban unconstitutional. As then NAACP President William Gibson told the 
Nunn committee [the congressional sub-committee investigating the efficacy of “Don’t 
Ask, Don’t Tell”]. The very same arguments seen now for keeping the homosexual ban 
had been used two generations ago: “They said whites would not shower with blacks, 
they would not sleep in the same barracks, they would not take orders from black 
superiors.” 
. . . These data are very consistent with the often reported finding that persons who are 
knowingly acquainted with at least one gay person are much less likely to report antigay 
animus than are those who do not believe they have any gay friends or acquaintances. 
Paul Siegel, Dry-Cleaning the Troops and Other Matters: A Critique of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” in SAME 
SEX: DEBATING THE ETHICS, SCIENCE, AND CULTURE OF HOMOSEXUALITY 274, 280 (John Corvino ed., 
1997) (alteration added). 
Of course, it is true that many gay and lesbian members of the armed service do not think of 
themselves as advocates for a cause. The same was probably true of black enlistees who wanted to 
serve in an integrated military. Many gays, like my friends mentioned in the Introduction, want only 
to serve their country, while doing no disservice to the loving relationships that sustain them when 
they are forced to go to unenviable places like Iraq. 
Some gays and lesbians, however, do wish to contribute to the debate. Their contribution to what 
is perhaps the defining social debate of our time is of no diminished importance and is no less 
normatively valuable simply because they have voluntarily joined in the armed defense of their 
nation. Moreover, how can we rationalize a policy that allows them to march in civilian clothes in a 
gay pride parade but which will not allow them to admit to fellow service members that they are 
gay? 
 34. ALICE WALKER, WE ARE THE ONES WE HAVE BEEN WAITING FOR: INNER LIGHT IN A TIME OF 
DARKNESS 186 (2006). 
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military setting.35 Wolff details the case of Steve May. From 1999 to 2002, May, a 
gay man, served as a Representative in the Arizona legislature.36 While on 
reserve status in the Army Reserves, May rose to challenge a particularly 
virulent anti-gay speech by another legislator, who supported a bill that would 
prohibit state agencies from providing domestic partnership benefits to same-
sex employees.37 In his speech on the floor of the Arizona House, May employed 
a very effective rhetorical tool: He explained why the anti-gay bill was a bad 
idea and offered himself, a stable, successful, non-promiscuous, state 
Representative as the foil to the picture of gays as depraved moral degenerates 
painted by the opposing Representative.38 This courage cost May his position in 
the military. Just a few months later, based upon his speech, the military began 
separation proceedings against May.39 The “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy’s 
unlimited scope, applying “24 hours each day” to expression “on or off base” 
and “on duty or off duty,”40 reached even the political speech of an elected 
representative of the people of Arizona.41 
May’s story is a drastic example of the damage that “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” 
does to the public debate about what is perhaps the defining civil rights issue of 
our day—equality for gays and lesbians in the United States. Of course, the 
same can be said for the effect of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” on the ability of active-
duty gays to contribute to the debate on this issue of momentous import. Who 
better to speak about the oppressive harm of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” than the 
people who labor daily under its constraints in the desperation of Iraq? Who 
better to speak in general opposition to the slurs and slander of the anti-gay 
camp, painting gays as weak misfits incapable of contributing to their country, 
than the brave gay men and lesbians who have chosen the armed defense of 
their nation? 
 
 35. See Tobias Barrington Wolff, Political Representation and Accountability Under Don’t Ask, Don’t 
Tell, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1633, 1665–68 (2004). 
 36. Id. at 1665–66. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. May eventually negotiated a voluntary separation agreement with the military. Professor 
Wolff reiterates this point beautifully in the amicus brief filed in the Cook v. Rumsfeld appeal. 
When a federal law reaches onto the floor of a state assembly to penalize an elected official 
for expressing a disfavored viewpoint in a legislative debate, the First Amendment is 
placed in serious jeopardy. “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” does not just restrict speech within 
military spaces or among military personnel. It silences gay service members in every 
walk of civilian and political life. Steve May’s case is remarkable only in that he refused to 
be silenced when his voice was needed. For that and that alone, he was discharged. 
First Amendment Brief, supra note 16, at 8–9. 
 40. 10 U.S.C. § 654(a)(9)–(11) (2000). 
 41. It also contravenes the Speech and Debate protections of the federal and most state 
constitutions. The federal Speech and Debate Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1, provides that 
members of Congress “shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony, and Breach of the Peace, be 
privileged from Arrest during their attendance at the Session of their Respective Houses, and in 
going to an from the same, and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be 
questioned in any other Place.” On speech and debate protections, see MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, FREE 
SPEECH, THE PEOPLE’S DARLING PRIVILEGE: STRUGGLES FOR FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN AMERICAN 
HISTORY 175–83, 343–48 (2000). 
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As it stands, the only soldiers who may speak in favor of the ability of gays 
and lesbians to live authentic lives while serving their country are straight 
soldiers, or gays who are secreting their authentic selves. It is a curious debate 
indeed when the only people prohibited from debating are the victims of the 
policy the debate addresses. Like Representative May, gay and lesbian service 
members may not identify themselves to the electorate even to speak on behalf 
of the Military Readiness Enhancement Act of 2007, which aims to repeal “Don’t 
Ask, Don’t Tell.”42 “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” ensures that the only viewpoint 
missing in the debate is the point of view of the gay or lesbian service member. 
But the central contribution of the First Amendment to American society is that 
it ensures every viewpoint has a chance to be heard. Surely, this philosophy is 
why the courts have held that viewpoint discrimination—the very kind of 
discrimination wrought by “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”—is the greatest of First 
Amendment sins.43 
These concepts of identity and destiny, central to over two centuries of First 
Amendment jurisprudence, were also central to the Lawrence Court’s 
invalidation of sodomy laws, because such laws “demean [gays’] existence [and] 
control their destiny.”44 The Marcum court recognized that this liberty interest 
extends to the military setting. And yet, “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” remains, 
leaving us with some unsettling questions. What good is the ability to write 
one’s destiny if the script can never be read? Is a mute liberty anything other 
than a fraud? In this way, “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” strikes at our constitutional 
foundations. For that reason, it ought to be evaluated under strict First 
Amendment scrutiny and struck down. 
II. FIRST AMENDMENT SCRUTINY AND THE “DEFENSE IS DIFFERENT” RATIONALE 
My thesis that “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” should be invalidated on First 
Amendment grounds will immediately be met with what I call the “Defense is 
 
 42. Military Readiness Enhancement Act (MREA) of 2007, H.R. 1246, 110th Cong., 1st Sess. (Feb. 
28, 2007). Rep. Martin Meehan (D-Mass.) first introduced the MREA in the 109th Congress in March, 
2005; the bill amassed 122 bipartisan cosponsors but did not make it past the House Armed Services 
Committee. See H.R. 1059, 109th Cong., 1st Sess. (Mar. 2, 2005). Rep. Meehan is now Chairman of the 
House Armed Services Personnel Subcommittee and has reintroduced the bill with 110 original 
cosponsors. 
 43. Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980), makes plain that the importance of the voice of military 
personnel in civilian debate is a vital constitutional interest. Glines upheld an Air Force regulation 
because its restriction of speech was limited to receiving prior approval before circulating a petition 
on a military base. The very regulation at issue preserved the right of the officer to circulate his 
petition among the civilian population and, indeed, to do so on base, subject to limited restriction, 
and in no event was he prohibited from petitioning purely because his petition was “critical of 
Government policies or officials.” Id. at 350 n.2. 
More broadly, Glines involved 10 U.S.C. §§ 1034(a), (c)(2)(A) (West Supp. 2004), which guarantees 
the right of service members to “communicat[e] with a Member of Congress or an Inspector 
General.” The Glines opinion presumed that service members have the right to dissent in matters of 
public concern because of this statute. By preventing service members from testifying to Congress 
about a bill that could repeal the policy, “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” contravenes the Court’s opinion and 
Congress’s express command. 
 44. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (alterations added). 
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Different” argument. Consequently, I will deal with this claim before discussing 
the application of First Amendment heightened scrutiny to the military’s policy. 
The “Defense is Different” argument is essentially a rationale for allowing 
government actions that would otherwise be blatantly unconstitutional, on the 
grounds that (1) the military is a very special environment requiring an especial 
surrender of personal liberty and (2) military officials have superior expertise to 
determine how the proper balance between uniformity and personal liberty is 
struck.45 Courts often embrace this argument through a policy of judicial 
deference to military decision-making—even in the face of a constitutional 
challenge. Thus, any claim that “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” should be declared 
unconstitutional as a violation of First Amendment speech rights will be more 
difficult than a similar challenge made outside the military context. However, no 
court has held that deference to the military is limitless.46 
In Goldman v. Weinberger, the Supreme Court adopted the “Defense is 
Different” rationale when it upheld an Air Force regulation barring the wearing 
of headgear indoors, over the objection of an orthodox Jew who wanted to wear 
a yarmulke.47 Professor Michael McConnell discusses Goldman in his essay, What 
Would It Mean to Have a “First Amendment” for Sexual Orientation?48 McConnell 
believes that application of the First Amendment to “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” 
would make no difference in terms of the constitutional validity of the policy, 
precisely because the judiciary must give deference to the expertise of military 
decision-makers in the special military environment. To illustrate his point, 
McConnell cites Goldman for the proposition that, “even when fundamental 
[First Amendment] freedoms are involved, the military enjoys wide discretion to 
limit conduct that it deems injurious to morale or otherwise inconsistent with 
the military mission.”49 McConnell summarizes the Goldman holding thusly: “It 
is permissible for soldiers to wear religious symbols under their clothing, where 
they cannot be seen, or in the privacy of their living quarters, but not in the 
 
 45. The special-ness of the military is crucial, because the Supreme Court has held that public 
employees generally have a First Amendment right to comment on matters of public concern. 
Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 570–72 (1968); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145–46 (1983). 
 46. “[O]ur citizens in uniform may not be stripped of basic rights simply because they have 
doffed their civilian clothes.” Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 515 (1986) (alteration added). 
“[M]en and women in the Armed Forces do not leave constitutional safeguards and judicial 
protection behind when they enter military service.” Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 194 (1994) 
(Ginsburg, J., concurring) (alteration added). “[I]t is apparent that the protections in the Bill of 
Rights, except those which are expressly or by necessary implication inapplicable, are available to 
members of our armed forces.” United States v. Jacoby, 11 C.M.A. 428, 430–31 (1960) (alteration 
added). 
 47. 475 U.S. 503 (1986). 
 48. Michael W. McConnell, What Would It Mean to Have a “First Amendment” for Sexual 
Orientation?, in SEXUAL ORIENTATION & HUMAN RIGHTS IN AMERICAN RELIGIOUS DISCOURSE 234–57 
(Saul M. Olyan & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 1998). McConnell’s piece, the inspiration for my own, 
discusses as analogy the application of the principles underlying the First Amendment’s Religion 
Clauses to sexual orientation. My piece, obviously, discusses the actual application of the First 
Amendment’s guarantee of free speech to render “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” unconstitutional. Despite 
these differences, Professor McConnell’s treatment of Goldman is instructive for the purposes of this 
essay. 
 49. Id. at 241. 
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open, where they might generate feelings of sectarian division rather than 
military unity.”50 
But McConnell’s deference argument is an oversimplification. Goldman’s 
holding is narrower that McConnell suggests. Justice Rehnquist wrote, “The Air 
Force has drawn the line essentially between religious apparel that is visible and 
that which is not, and we hold that those portions of the regulations challenged 
here reasonably and evenhandedly regulate dress in the interest of the military’s 
perceived need for uniformity.”51 Justices Stevens, Powell, and White concurred, 
making it clear that they voted with Rehnquist because “the rule that is 
challenged in this case is based on a neutral, completely objective standard—
visibility.”52 Furthermore, the concurrence explained that, “The Air Force has no 
business drawing distinctions between such persons when it is enforcing 
commands of universal application.”53 
There are obvious and crucial differences between a policy that forbids the 
wearing of apparel that disrupts the uniformity of military attire and a policy 
that would exclude self-identifying Jews—qua Jews—from the military, or a 
policy that would exclude Jews but not Catholics from military service. After 
Goldman, Jews may still identify as Jews and not be barred from service. A Jew 
may make the statement “I am a Jew” to fellow service members and not be 
threatened with separation. Presumably, the military could not say that the 
presence of a Jew upsets our mostly Catholic and Baptist forces and, therefore, 
Jews cannot be allowed. But the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” definition of conduct 
bars even this sort of self-identification speech on the part of lesbians and gays. 
Professor McConnell also believes that the inherent non-neutrality in a 
regulation that forbids yarmulkes might be acceptable because it does not 
purposefully target religious minorities—although it happens to be congruent 
with the habits of our predominately Christian populace. He believes that this 
logic extends to “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.” In his view, it does not “necessarily 
reflect bias, prejudice, or even insensitivity.”54 Again, Professor McConnell 
leaves unspoken an important distinction between military dress regulations 
and “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.” Even the most willfully blind observer must 
acknowledge that “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” is aimed at the unpopular lesbian and 
gay minority. The regulation at issue in Goldman forbade wearing yarmulkes, 
but it would have also forbidden Catholics from emblazoning their uniforms 
with a cross, Hindus from wearing a turban, or female Muslim soldiers from 
covering their heads. “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” is quite different. It intentionally 
singles out the lesbian and gay minority and targets conduct (kissing, hand-
holding, vocal expression of romantic feeling—and even speech identifying 
one’s sexual orientation) deemed innocuous when it is performed in an identical 
manner by heterosexual service members. The neutrality buttressing the 
Goldman decision is sorely lacking from “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.” Like Professor 
 
 50. Id. at 242. 
 51. Goldman, 475 U.S. at 510 (emphasis added). 
 52. Id. at 513 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 53. Id. 
 54. McConnell, supra note 48, at 242. 
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McConnell,55 I believe that Goldman was wrongly decided. Even so, Goldman 
should not prevent the application of heightened First Amendment scrutiny to 
“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.” 
Decisions dealing specifically with speech rights in the military setting offer 
little additional support for “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.” The limited factual 
scenarios resulting in the opinions in Parker v. Levy56 and Greer v. Spock57 do not 
buttress the pernicious legal regime currently targeting gay and lesbian service 
members.58 In each of these cases, the Court recited the “Defense is Different” 
litany and ultimately upheld the military’s regulation of speech. But nothing in 
these opinions suggests that the military is so different from civilian life as to 
warrant the pointed and selective circumscription of gays’ and lesbians’ First 
Amendment rights that “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” demands. 
Parker v. Levy, decided by a 5–3 split (Justice Marshall did not participate), 
held that, when an army officer urged otherwise lawfully conscripted men to 
evade the draft in a time of war, his speech was “unprotected under the most 
expansive notions of the First Amendment.”59 Given its highly specific facts, 
Parker’s holding should be read as narrowly as it was intended. Gays and 
lesbians desiring to serve in the military do not want to evade military service, 
nor do they wish to encourage others to do so. In today’s volunteer military and 
unsettled world climate, they are rushing toward a job that many of us do not 
covet. They are not urging desertion or other vice to the United States—they are 
trying to serve! 
Greer involved candidates for national political office who were denied the 
right to distribute campaign materials on a military base. In upholding the 
military’s regulations barring the respondents from the base, the Court held: 
“With respect to [the regulations], there is no claim that the military authorities 
discriminated in any way among candidates for public office based upon the 
 
 55. Id. 
 56. 417 U.S. 733 (1974). 
 57. 424 U.S. 828 (1976). 
 58. I have always thought that Parker and Greer were wrongly decided and ought to be 
overruled. Too many dictatorships are supported by militaries lacking access to the truth. But even 
as decided, the cases are not obstacles to heightened First Amendment scrutiny of “Don’t Ask, Don’t 
Tell.” 
 59. 417 U.S. at 761. Specifically, the officer said: 
The United States is wrong in being involved in the Viet Nam War. I would refuse to go to 
Viet Nam if ordered to do so. I don’t see why any colored soldier would go to Viet Nam: 
they should refuse to go to Viet Nam and if sent should refuse to fight because they are 
discriminated against and denied their freedom in the United States, and they are 
sacrificed and discriminated against in Viet Nam by being given all the hazardous duty 
and they are suffering the majority of casualties. If I were a colored soldier I would refuse 
to go to Viet Nam and if I were sent I would refuse to fight. Special Forces personnel are 
liars and thieves and killers of peasants and murderers of women and children. 
Id. at 736–37. 
I made very similar comments about gay soldiers’ involvement in the Iraq War, urging gays and 
lesbians in the military to “come out” and to be discharged. See Shannon Gilreath, Know Thine 
Enemy, PRIDE & EQUALITY, Jan./Feb. 2006, at 3. Mercifully, I made my comments as a civilian; thus I 
was not subject to a loss of my job, loss of retirement benefits, and confinement for three years at 
hard labor. 
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candidates’ supposed political views.”60 The Court also held that the regulations 
had been “objectively and evenhandedly applied.”61 The policy, the Court 
continued, was “wholly consistent with the American constitutional tradition of 
a politically neutral military establishment under civilian control.”62 
By comparison, even the most ardent defender of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” 
could not honestly assert that “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” is a neutral policy—it 
doesn’t even feign neutrality. It is not “objectively and evenhandedly applied,” 
and it does not even purport to be objective. It targets expression—kissing, 
hand-holding, self-identification—that is entirely permissible when performed 
by heterosexual service members and makes it a basis for discharge from 
military service when performed by homosexual service members.63 The Greer 
Court summed up thusly: a commanding officer “may not prevent distribution 
of a publication simply because he does not like its contents . . . . This case, 
therefore, simply does not raise any question of unconstitutional application of 
the regulation to any specific situation.”64 Can anyone—even the most tenacious 
anti-gay proponent of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”—seriously make that claim about 
“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”? 
Two other decisions are instructive in determining how “Don’t Ask, Don’t 
Tell” should be treated. In Employment Division v. Smith,65 the Court held that 
generally-applicable, neutral laws would be safe from First Amendment 
challenge.66 Presumably, under the Smith rationale, a public ban on all headgear 
indoors, even in the civilian context, would not be unconstitutional for failing to 
include a religious exemption. But the Court took a different view of the 
regulation at issue in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah.67 In 
that case, the Court struck down an ordinance making animal sacrifice illegal 
inside the city limits of Hialeah, Florida. The Court held that the ordinance was 
directly aimed at the Santeria cult, which practiced animal sacrifice, and thus 
failed the generally-applicable, neutral criteria used in Smith (and in Goldman).68 
The fact that the law specifically targeted the expressive conduct of an 
unpopular religious minority was enough to condemn it on constitutional 
grounds. Likewise, “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” does not pretend at neutrality. Like 
the ordinance at issue in Hialeah (and unlike the law in Smith), it is a law aimed 
specifically at an unpopular group’s expression. 
Additionally, Marcum itself complicates application of the “Defense is 
Different” rationale to “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.” In Marcum, the government 
argued that the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces should “apply 
traditional principles of deference to Congress’s exercise of its Article I authority 
 
 60. Greer, 424 U.S. at 838–39 (alteration added). 
 61. Id. at 839. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Professor McConnell believes that neutrality is not constitutionally significant in the 
military setting. However, the Parker and Greer Courts both held otherwise. 
 64. Greer, 424 U.S. at 840. 
 65. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 66. Id. at 885. 
 67. 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993). 
 68. Id. at 2222. 
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and not apply the Lawrence holding to the military.”69 In determining that 
Lawrence should apply in the military context, the court specifically asked, 
“[A]re there additional factors relevant solely in the military environment that 
affect the nature and reach of the Lawrence liberty interest?”70 By finding that the 
sexual relationship in question was inherently coercive, the court declined to 
strike Marcum’s conviction.71 Nevertheless, the court did hold that, because the 
conduct occurred off-base, in private, and non-forcibly, it therefore was 
protected within the scope of Lawrence.72 The court suggested that, but for the 
coercion inherent in a sexual relationship between a superior and subordinate 
officer, the conduct would have been covered by Lawrence. Indeed, in United 
States v. Humphreys,73 the Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals 
reversed a sodomy court martial, holding that Lawrence precluded the 
prosecution of a male navy member for having anal sex with a female navy 
member in a barracks bedroom.74 If the military is not so different as to preclude 
a substantive due process challenge to the criminalization of consensual acts of 
sodomy, why is it so different as to justify a policy of ousting service members 
who hold hands with or kiss members of the same gender, or who otherwise 
signify that they would engage in same-sex sexual activity? The answer is, the 
military is not so different, and no bow to military deference saves “Don’t Ask, 
Don’t Tell.”75 
III. STRICT SCRUTINY AS THE APPROPRIATE STANDARD 
Having dealt with the issue of military deference, we now see that strict 
scrutiny emerges as the appropriate evaluative standard for the government’s 
regulations of expression via “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.” Governmental regulation 
of expressive conduct warrants strict scrutiny when (1) the regulation of speech 
or conduct targets the message that the speech or conduct communicates to 
others and (2) similar expression is regulated differently based on the 
 
 69. United States v. Marcum, 60 M.J. 198, 206 (C.A.A.F. 2004). 
 70. Id. at 207. 
 71. Id. at 208. 
 72. Id. at 207. 
 73. NMCA 200300750, 2005 WL 3591140 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. Dec. 29, 2005). 
 74. Id. 
 75. It is also worth noting that the sweeping effect of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” on civilian 
discourse, discussed in Part I, supra, may also destroy any claim to military deference. In United 
States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), the Court upheld a statute banning the burning of a draft card. 
Even though the regulation was obviously related to the mission of the military, the Court 
recognized the myriad effects of the regulation on public debate and proceeded with no mention of 
deference to military mission. Rather, the Court indicated that, had the regulation been designed for 
the suppression of expression, it would have been evaluated under traditional First Amendment 
analysis and strict scrutiny. Ultimately, the Court upheld the regulation, finding that it was not 
aimed at the suppression of expression, because it did not target only expressive public burnings of 
the draft card and because it was designed to effectuate an orderly administration of the draft in a 
time of war. “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” is the antithesis of the regulation at issue in O’Brien: It is 
designed specifically for the suppression of expression—even expression that reaches the realm of 
public, civilian debate—and it does not even feign another purpose. Following O’Brien, strict 
scrutiny is therefore appropriate. See also First Amendment Brief, supra note 16, at 24–25 (elaborating 
a similar argument). 
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communicated viewpoint of the speaker. Regulation of expression may be 
upheld when the regulation is sufficiently divorced from the communicative 
content of the expression or expressive conduct. The government may, for 
example, constitutionally prohibit the burning of a draft card during a time of 
military conscription, because the government has a strong interest in ensuring 
the proper functioning of the draft system—an interest independent from any 
desire to squelch the dissenting message that burning the draft card in public 
necessarily entails.76 The government may not, however, prohibit the burning of 
the American flag, even when it is burnt in close proximity to a crowd of people 
presumably offended by its having been burnt.77 To allow this type of expressive 
conduct to be punished or restricted would establish a “heckler’s veto” and thus 
would commit the cardinal First Amendment sin—that of viewpoint 
discrimination. In the Johnson flag burning case, the Court stated that the critical 
criterion for evaluating the regulation of expressive conduct is whether the 
government’s regulation is “related to the suppression of expression.”78 In the 
post-Lawrence military environment—one in which consensual sodomy is no 
longer punishable—no one can seriously suggest that “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” is 
not related to the suppression of expression.79 The policy’s very name is 
 
 76. O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 367. As Cole and Eskridge point out, even that decision was based, in 
part, on the fact that the questioned regulation did not “distinguish between public and private 
destruction.” Id. at 375. In other words, the first clue as to whether the regulation is related to the 
suppression of expression is the neutrality of the regulation itself. Similarly, the statute at issue in 
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989), prohibited only that flag-burning which would likely offend 
“one or more persons likely to observe or discover” the burning; the ban was therefore facially 
discriminatory as to a specific kind of expressive conduct. “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” is the antithesis of 
O’Brien and the mirror of Johnson: The military is only concerned with the public acknowledgement of 
homosexuality, thus constituting a content-specific regulation of a particular type of expressive 
conduct. 
 77. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 408 (1989). 
 78. Id. at 407. 
 79. Even before Marcum’s extension of the Lawrence liberty interest to the military setting, 
“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” (as separate and apart from the military’s criminal prohibition of sodomy) 
professed only to be concerned with public expressions of homosexuality. The military’s ban on 
sodomy, however, was in place to take care of private expressions of homosexuality as well. Of 
course, the sodomy ban itself is less problematic when evaluated under a free speech rubric, because 
it prohibits the conduct by both homosexual and heterosexual actors. 
It is important to note that the military’s insistence that the concern is one of public expression, 
and claiming that what a service member does in private falls beyond the scope of “Don’t Ask, Don’t 
Tell,” is a poor effort to transmute “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” into a permissible “time/place/manner” 
regulation of expression. But when the regulation of place and manner is so stringent that it 
effectively relegates the expression to an impenetrable “closet,” it becomes impermissible. The Court 
has never upheld as constitutional a place and manner restriction that is so stringent as to render the 
message effectively unutterable in public or in private. That was the principle underlying the Johnson 
decision. If we rewrote the statute at issue in Johnson in a “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” framework, we 
might have a statute that reads: “Flag burning is legal as long as the flag is burned at the hearth of 
one’s own residence when no one else is present to witness the act.” The Court would have just as 
surely invalidated this content-based restriction in the guise of a time and manner regulation as it 
did the statute at issue in Johnson. 
This discussion of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” in traditional First Amendment terms is made more 
difficult because of the government’s conflation of pure speech and expressive conduct. As noted 
above, “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” defines “statements” as “conduct.” Restrictions on “time, place, and 
manner” are traditionally the parlance of speech cases, while restriction “unrelated to the 
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suggestive of the fact that it was designed to regulate the mere telling—the 
expressing—of a homosexual sexual orientation.80 The fact that the military 
disclaims any interest in the private sexual proclivities of its members and 
focuses only on public declarations is also indicative of the central concern of 
preventing gay and lesbian service members from “telling” about their sexual 
orientation. The government maintains that it is not interested in orientation, but 
rather in the public manifestations of that orientation—that is, the government is 
interested in the expression primarily on account of its communicative content. 
The military’s policy of expressive exclusion, thus, warrants First Amendment 
strict scrutiny at every turn. 
Moreover, a policy targeting only the homosexual viewpoint conflicts with 
the Supreme Court’s decision in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul.81 In striking a city 
ordinance that punished particular expressions of hate speech but not others, the 
Court held, “[t]he First Amendment generally prevents government from 
proscribing speech or even expressive conduct because of disapproval of the 
ideas expressed.”82 R.A.V. expands the principle the Court laid down in Police 
Department of Chicago v. Mosley, in which the Court struck down an anti-
picketing ordinance because it included an exemption for labor pickets.83 The 
Court held that picketing was plainly expressive and within the protections of 
the First Amendment, and that any selective ban would have to serve a 
substantial state interest.84 In much the same way that the Lawrence Court relied 
on the Due Process Clause to effectuate equal protection, the Mosley Court relied 
heavily on both the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause in its 
opinion. The selective expression of some points of view failed both 
constitutional tests. R.A.V. made an even more forceful application of the equal 
expression guarantee by applying the concept to “fighting words” and similar 
expression that had formerly been outside First Amendment parameters. 
“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” evinces the same equality anathema. The policy is 
founded on precisely the sort of naked selectivity that troubled the Mosley and 
R.A.V. Courts. Under “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” homosexual service members are 
prohibited from speaking about their sexual orientations, while heterosexuals 
may speak of their orientations so frequently and casually that they often do not 
even realize they are doing it. Heterosexual service members need not secret 
their opposite-sex romances. They are privileged to embrace and kiss openly. 
However, the same conduct performed by homosexuals is grounds for 
discharge. This worse-than-R.A.V.-type selectivity is yet another reason that 
 
suppression of expression” has been the talisman phrase of expressive conduct cases. But the Court 
noted in Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984), that evaluating a time, 
place, and manner restriction concerning speech is essentially the same test as evaluating whether 
the regulation of conduct is “unrelated to the suppression of expression.” For illustrative purposes, 
and because “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” defines speech as conduct, I have used the terminology 
interchangeably. 
 80. See Cole & Eskridge, supra note 8, at 332. 
 81. 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 
 82. Id. at 382 (citations omitted). 
 83. 408 U.S. 92 (1972). 
 84. Id. at 99. 
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“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” should be invalidated under heightened First 
Amendment review. 
IV. THE MILITARY’S JUSTIFICATIONS FOR “DON’T ASK, DON’T TELL” 
FAIL STRICT SCRUTINY REVIEW 
Having arrived at the appropriate level of scrutiny, why does “Don’t Ask, 
Don’t Tell” fail to pass muster? The government has consistently argued two 
reasons why “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” is necessary for the function of the military: 
privacy of the soldier and unit cohesion. Each of these reasons amounts to a lot 
of puffing. Certainly, they do not amount to compelling interests accomplished 
by the narrowly-tailored means required by the First Amendment when 
quintessentially political expression is targeted because of its message.85 
A. Privacy Rights for Heterosexuals 
A common but silly argument to justify “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” is the so-
called privacy argument. One might also term this the “shower argument.” In 
essence, it claims that heterosexual men will feel sexually objectified and 
violated if they are forced to allow their gay comrades to see them naked. This 
argument has been embraced by judges hostile to sexually integrating the armed 
services. 
The embarrassment of being naked between the sexes is prevalent because 
sometimes the other is considered to be a sexual object. The quite rational 
assumption in the Navy is that with no one present who has a homosexual 
orientation, men and women alike can undress, sleep, bathe, and use the 
bathroom without fear or embarrassment that they are being viewed as sexual 
objects.86 
The argument is particularly nonsensical because heterosexual soldiers are 
already showering with gay soldiers. And so what? Such a silly argument 
deserves an equally dismissive reply: Grow up. Obeying orders is part and 
parcel of military service. That is the case even when an order demands that one 
risk life and limb in a dangerous battle. And yet soldiers cannot be expected to 
obey an order requiring them to shower beside a homosexual person? 
Moreover, why would knowing the man showering next to you is gay be a 
greater invasion of privacy? Wouldn’t it, in fact, be less so? Does the 
objectification come only when one knows he is being objectified? 
Perhaps heterosexual men are simply afraid that the treatment they reserve 
for women will somehow be visited on them. The idea that we separate the 
genders in changing rooms is less about eroticism than it is about the historic 
 
 85. Regardless of the justifications the military fabricates to support its bigoted polices, it is 
hard to conceive of any of them as even “rational,” considering that, over the last ten years, “Don’t 
Ask, Don’t Tell” has deprived the armed services of thousands of qualified military personnel 
during a time of heavy deployment and sagging recruitment, while simultaneously wasting $364 
million of public funds. See Josh White, ‘Don’t Ask’ Costs More Than Expected, WASH. POST, Feb. 14, 
2006, at A4. 
 86. Steffan v. Cheney, 780 F. Supp. 1, 13 (D.D.C. 1991), aff’d en banc sub nom., Steffan v. Perry, 41 
F.3d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
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objectification of women.87 Any eroticism that comes from cross-gender undress 
is found less in the nakedness and more in the expectation. Men have 
historically eroticized women. Even today we see billboards and posters of 
women in suggestive poses. We rarely see men advertised in quite the same 
way. Featuring a bare-breasted woman in movies is considered mainstream, but 
we are still shocked to see male frontal nudity. Women do not want to undress 
in front of men because they are keenly aware of this cultural pattern. Men are 
less concerned about undressing in front of women because they do not share 
the same history of objectification. If men are concerned, they are concerned 
about the sudden role reversal. Yet, if openly gay men and women are allowed 
in the military, we will still segregate the genders as we do now. Men will 
continue treating men (and women will treat women) with the same “etiquette 
of disregard”88 that has always attended instances of same-gender undress. 
In any case, the privacy-in-the-shower argument is little more than “a raw 
appeal to prejudice”89 It insults gays by asserting that all gays are sexually 
predatory, and it defies common sense by assuming that all heterosexuals are 
sexually appealing to all gays. It does not amount to a compelling interest. It is 
also severely under-inclusive, because gay and straight soldiers have been 
showering together since “at least the time of Julius Caesar.”90 Allowing gays 
into the communal shower as long as they profess to be straight hardly solves 
the problem. “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” merely lets heterosexual men continue to 
deny the reality that they have lived with all along. Pretending that the world is 
different than it really is cannot constitute a compelling interest. 
The “privacy” argument is exactly the sort of double-speak common from 
the military establishment when it comes to recognizing gay and lesbian service 
members. Consider that a group of military personnel sued the U.S. government 
when they realized they had been the subjects of certain dangerous 
experimental testing without their knowledge or consent.91 The government 
successfully argued that the soldiers were not entitled to damages for these 
indignities.92 Today, the government argues that if openly gay people are 
allowed into the military, straight soldiers would lose the privacy and dignity 
they enjoy in civilian life. This juxtaposition isn’t rational—it’s almost laughable. 
 
 87. One might say the historic subjection of women. Consider the following passage from a 
popular Victorian-era book: 
One of the first things that a mother seeks to instill into the mind of her little girl, is a 
feeling of shame which centers about the pelvic organs and their functions. This feeling, 
together with shyness, bashfulness, timidity, etc., develops a modesty which constitutes 
one of the chief, if not the greatest, of feminine charms. The mother is paving the way for 
her daughter’s future happiness, for this commendable virtue not only acts as a shield and 
protection to the girl, but, by giving play to the imagination, provides for the happiness of 
her future lover. 
C.W. MALCHOW, THE SEXUAL LIFE 60–61 (22d ed. 1923), quoted in OUT IN FORCE: SEXUAL 
ORIENTATION AND THE MILITARY 230 (Gregory M. Herek et al. eds., 1996). 
 88. OUT IN FORCE, supra note 87, at 231. 
 89. See Cole & Eskridge, supra note 8, at 341. 
 90. Barry Goldwater, The Gay Ban: Just Plain Un-American, WASH. POST, June 10, 1993, at A23. 
 91. United States v. Stanley, 479 U.S. 1005 (1986). 
 92. Id. 
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B. Unit Cohesion 
The most persuasive of the government’s arguments in support of “Don’t 
Ask, Don’t Tell” is the argument that the cohesion and effectiveness of the 
military will be undermined by the presence of openly gay service members. 
During the 1993 congressional hearings, Colonel William Henderson opined 
that unit cohesion was the “central factor” in the military’s success. If openly 
gay soldiers were present, the “discipline, good order, and morale” of the armed 
services would suffer.93 Of course, none of us, especially in this age of color-
coded terrorist threats and the inability to board a plane carrying much more 
than a tube of toothpaste, wants to undermine the effective defense of our 
nation. The problem is not in the military’s bald assertion of the defense interest; 
the problem is found in the false logic inherent in the characterization. “Don’t 
Ask, Don’t Tell” proponents would have us read the argument this way: 
(a) An effective defense of the nation is of paramount importance. 
(b) Demoralized troops will not provide cohesive, effective armed service. 
(c) Gays will demoralize the troops. 
(d) Therefore, openly gay service members will undermine the defense of 
the United States. 
When the argument is characterized in this way, a ban on openly gay service 
members might appear rational. But when we fill in the missing pieces of the 
argument, its irrationality is quickly exposed. 
The easiest way to see that irrationality is to replace the argument’s 
reference to “gays” with reference to “blacks.”94 This requires no great feat of 
imagination, because it was precisely the argument made in resistance to racial 
integration of the military in the 1940s. The Army maintained that 
[t]he soldier on the battlefield deserves to have, and must have, utmost 
confidence in his fellow soldiers. They must eat together, sleep together, and all 
too frequently die together. There can be no friction in their every-day living 
that might bring on failure in battle. A chain is only as strong as its weakest link, 
and this is true of the Army unit on the battlefield.95 
Indeed, the overwhelmingly racist feelings of enlisted men in the 1940s seemed 
to foreshadow just the sort of tempest the Army feared. Polls conducted in 1942 
showed that 90 percent of white soldiers opposed unit integration, as did 
 
 93. Policy Implications of Lifting the Ban on Homosexuals in the Military: Hearings before the House 
Committee on Armed Services, 103d Cong. 265–70 (1993). 
 94. The comparison of hetero-supremacy to white supremacy has been hotly contested. See 
GILREATH, SEXUAL POLITICS, supra note 7, at 128-29. Gays hoped that the ascendancy of a black man 
to a leadership position in the military would bring about beneficial change. But Colin Powell, 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” was debated, was no ally. 
Powell rejected the comparison, opining that sexual orientation was not a “benign” characteristic in 
the same way that he viewed race. He remained true to the neo-conservatism that would make him 
Secretary of State for George W. Bush and true to the Joint Chiefs of Staff track record of often being 
on the wrong side of history. (The Joint Chiefs supported the internment of Japanese-Americans 
during World War II and opposed racial desegregation of the military in the 1940s.) See WILLIAM N. 
ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET 192 (1999). 
 95. RICHARD DALFIUME, DESEGREGATION OF THE U.S. ARMED FORCES 189 n.38 (1969); see also 
ESKRIDGE, supra note 94, at 192. 
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approximately forty percent of enlisted blacks, nearly all of whom were serving 
in segregated units.96 And yet when the Army did deploy integrated units at the 
end of World War II, not only did the United States and its allies emerge as 
victors, but the Army found that it provided “better utilization of manpower.” 
Surveys showed that seventy-seven percent of those involved in the experiment 
found after serving with blacks that integrated units were preferable. Virtually 
no soldiers found it less preferable.97 When President Truman finally ordered 
full-scale desegregation of the military in 1948,98 the military did not 
disintegrate. On the contrary, it has remained the undisputed preeminent 
military power on the globe. A recent poll shows that seventy-three percent of 
military personnel polled are comfortable with gays and lesbians and that 
seventy-eight percent of respondents currently serving would still have joined if 
gays and lesbians were allowed to serve openly. Only ten percent reporting that 
they would not have joined.99 
Moreover, the military’s selective enforcement of the gay ban also counsels 
that gays do not actually undermine unit cohesion or effectiveness. The military 
has a history of retaining gays in times of war—when they suddenly become a 
useful resource.100 If gays were really a hindrance to military effectiveness, they 
would be discharged even—perhaps especially—during wartime. 
Far from satisfying strict-scrutiny review, the unit-cohesion argument does 
not even pass rational-basis review. The government’s own studies, long 
repressed, show no negative impact from employing gay and lesbian service 
members.101 Even those studies cited by Colonel Henderson in the hearings do 
not support the idea that gays would undermine unit cohesion.102 The Stouffer 
 
 96. Polling data reprinted in MORRIS MACGREGOR, JR., INTEGRATION OF THE ARMED FORCES, 
1940–1965, at 40 (1981); ESKRIDGE, supra note 94, at 192. 
 97. MACGREGOR, supra note 96, at 54. 
 98. See Exec. Order No. 9981, 13 Fed. Reg. 4313 (July 26, 1948) (“There shall be equality of 
treatment and opportunity for all persons in the armed services without regard to race, color, 
religion or national origin . . . .”). 
 99. Zogby International, Opinions of Military Personnel on Sexual Minorities in the Military 
(2006), http://www.palmcenter.org/files/active/0/ZogbyReport.pdf. 
 100. See GILREATH, SEXUAL POLITICS, supra note 7, at 15 (noting World War II and subsequent 
policies of retaining gays under a “medicalization” policy in wartime); see also Watkins v. United 
States, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989). Perry Watkins had been drafted to serve in Vietnam despite his 
openness about his homosexuality. He was allowed to reenlist several times. Fifteen years later, just 
short of pension eligibility, the military began separation proceedings against Watkins, declaring 
known homosexuals to be incompatible with military service. The Ninth Circuit ruled en banc that 
the army was estopped from this procedural trickery. 
Additionally, in response to questioning, a military spokesperson put a different spin on the 
policy of retaining gays in wartime. Kim Waldron, of the U.S. Army Forces Command at Fort 
McPherson, said, “The bottom line is some people are using sexual orientation to avoid deployment. 
So in this case, with the Reserve and Guard forces, if a soldier ‘tells,’ they still have to go to war and 
the homosexual issue is postponed until they return to the U.S. and the unit is demobilized.” 
Pentagon Acknowledges Sending Openly Gay Service Members to War, Sept. 23, 2005, http://www.palm 
center.org/press/dadt/releases/pentagon_acknowledges_sending_openly_gay_service_members_t
o_war_acknowledgement_follows_discovery_of_regulat (last visited Feb. 19, 2006). 
 101. See GAYS IN UNIFORM: THE PENTAGON’S SECRET REPORTS xv (Kate Dyer ed., 1990). 
 102. Policy Implications of Lifting the Ban on Homosexuals in the Military: Hearings Before the House 
Comm. on Armed Services, 103d Cong. 268 (1993). 
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study found that shared religious belief was the unifying element for U.S. 
soldiers during World War II. In fact, it revealed high instances of anti-
Semitism.103 But no one would seriously suggest that we could constitutionally 
bar Jews from military service because of the possibility that a majority of 
Christian soldiers would negatively react to their presence. To give the example 
a modern twist, could we bar Muslim soldiers because of possible negative 
reaction in the current climate? Other studies cited by Colonel Henderson 
showed that “primary group solidarity in the Wehrmacht” was based in part on 
“latent homosexual tendencies” among soldiers.104 Henderson’s conclusion 
hardly reinforces the untruth that gays undermine cohesion. Rather, it is 
reminiscent of the prowess of the Sacred Band of Thebes.105 In the United States, 
there is considerable anecdotal evidence that the sexual orientation of many gay 
soldiers has been known to their comrades with no negative effect on cohesion 
or morale.106 
It is also worth noting that the United States is virtually alone among its 
allies in sexually segregating its troops. The United States has not complained 
about Great Britain’s aid in the Iraq War, even though Great Britain has a 
sexually-integrated military, as do most other Western nations. The Pentagon 
has made no complaints about the “ineffectiveness” of our allies in the “War on 
Terror.”107 Moreover, police forces serve a quasi-military purpose in the United 
States, and yet the nation’s largest police forces, in New York City and Los 
Angeles (among others), have no restrictions on openly gay personnel. 
Another missing piece of the pro-silence argument is the effect that it has 
on gays and lesbians who are forced to live the lie. Gay and lesbian service 
members are demoralized by “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” but these morale-
debasing effects are rarely discussed.108 Nineteen-year-old Seaman Apprentice 
John Graff spoke for countless voiceless gay and lesbian service members when 
he said, “It’s emotionally distressing, because you constantly have this weight 
on you, that someone is going to find out somehow, that you could lose your 
job.”109 Gays cannot object when they hear heterosexist slurs. Like Major Witt, 
they cannot be honest about the relationships that likely sustain them. They 
 
 103. See Cole & Eskridge, supra note 8, at 339 
 104. Id. 
 105. According to Plutarch, the Sacred Band was an army of 150 homosexual couples (300 gay 
men) famous for their bravery and ferocity. The Thebans employed them strategically, believing that 
the bond between lovers would inspire more bravery than mere masculine friendship or even 
familial ties. See PLUTARCH, LIFE OF PELOPIDAS (Bernadotte Perrin trans., Harv. Univ. Press. 1967). 
 106. See generally Cole & Eskridge, supra note 8, at 339 (sources cited). 
 107. It is also true that some sixty-four percent of the U.S. population believes that gays and 
lesbians should be able to serve openly in the military. (See GILREATH, SEXUAL POLITICS, supra note 7, 
at 32 (gathering polling data)). Unless we assume that military enlistees are far more ignorant or 
prejudiced than the general population (an untenable assertion), we cannot assume that service 
members will react negatively to a repeal of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.” Indeed, recent polling data 
suggests the opposite reaction. See supra note 99 and accompanying discussion. 
 108. Retired Rear Admiral John D. Hutson, a former Navy judge advocate general, was recently 
quoted as saying, “The real cost is the cost in human dignity, in self-respect, and in the image of the 
military held by the American public, the world community and itself . . . . The dignity of the armed 
forces is at stake.” See White, supra note 85, at A4. 
 109. Id. 
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cannot even object to the smothering heterosexism so endemic of this culture by 
saying simply, “You are assuming I am straight, but I am not.” Of course it is 
true that men and women who voluntarily enlist in the military know they will 
sacrifice individuality. But regulations about how long your hair can be or how 
shiny your boots must be are a far cry from regulations that make you hide a 
core part of your identity. What is more demoralizing than that? 
There are significant morale (and moral) problems with a policy that 
purports to separate the significance of an underlying identity from the 
expression of that identity. In Part I of this essay, I argued that a chief First 
Amendment aspiration is that of personal development. The First Amendment 
ensures that the United States is not a society of secret creeds and whispered 
identities. Each citizen’s definition of self is, at least theoretically, given a 
comparable value. In that regard, “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” represents the 
opposite of First Amendment values. In essence, it is akin to the “love the sinner, 
hate the sin” mantra of my Southern Baptist youth. The smug superiority, often 
part and parcel of being one of the “majority,” made it difficult for my moral 
mentors to understand how truly impossible it was for them to love me and yet 
“hate” a core part of my identity as a human. 
I was recently reminded of the hopelessness I felt in my youth when a 
colleague sent me a cartoon snipped from the local newspaper. The cartoon 
depicted a priest on the steps of a church with outstretched arms under a banner 
that read: “Welcome to the Inherently Disordered”—referencing the Catholic 
Church’s recent pronouncement (reiteration?) that gays are “inherently 
disordered.” “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” like the Catholic Church, only welcomes 
those gays who refuse to act on or acknowledge their orientation and innate 
human nature. Gays and lesbians are told that, in order to be part of the greater 
good (church, military, etc.), they must sacrifice who they are. I know from 
experience that the psychological effects of being forced to live that kind of lie 
are overwhelmingly detrimental. Considering that the military does not deny 
that gays and lesbians currently serve in its ranks, it is curious that the military 
has no regard for the morale problems inherent in perpetuating a policy of 
enforced silence. Far from satisfying strict scrutiny, the military’s justifications 
for “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” are not even rational. 
CONCLUSION 
There is a palpable link between the Lawrence liberty interest in having 
one’s sexuality respected and the First Amendment interest in having one’s 
expression respected. Lawrence stands for the proposition that sodomy laws 
demean the existence of gay people. For this reason, criminal proscriptions of 
homosexual sex are no longer constitutionally permissible. “Don’t Ask, Don’t 
Tell” similarly demeans gay people’s existence. What is more demeaning than 
telling someone that they may “exist,” but only in secret? For gays and lesbians, 
more than any other group, expression is a key component of existence. Because 
gays are not a discrete minority, easily visible in the same way as race or gender, 
they must be able to express their identity in order to live authentically. This has 
been the central theme of the gay struggle: the right to “come out” and to 
identify as gay in a heterocentric society. 
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At bottom, “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” is bigotry. And of course, “Don’t Ask, 
Don’t Tell” is extreme censorship—including censorship of speech that goes to 
the very heart of the First Amendment. That should be no surprise: hatred, 
intolerance, and suppression of speech have gone hand-in-hand throughout 
history. “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” tells Americans that the very expression of a 
gay or lesbian identity is disgusting. It sends the message that, because gays are 
so disgusting, straight soldiers will not want to work with them and should not 
be required to do so. It provides a legal “heckler’s veto” for service members 
who do not want to hear the unpleasant realities of a sexually-diverse America. 
They do not even want to hear that gay people exist. “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” 
squelches gay people’s identities, based entirely on the fear that a (presumably) 
hostile audience will have a (presumably) negative reaction. This offends the 
very core of the constitutionally-protected liberty at issue in Lawrence and at the 
heart of the First Amendment: the liberty to define ourselves and to publicly 
express that self-definition. When subjected to First Amendment scrutiny 
without the benefit of deference to military policy, “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” must 
fall as constitutionally defective. 
